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I.

INTRODUCTION

Is tort law, as claimed in a recent Vanderbilt Law Review article by Professor
John C.P. Goldberg, "unloved"?' Is it true that "notwithstanding its continued
presence in the first-year curriculum, tort is a department of the law that has fewer
serious champions than any comparable subdiscipline"? 2 In a breathtaking spate
of recent writings, Professor Goldberg has sought to re-energize tort law and to spur
twenty-first century tort scholars to return to respecting-and hopefully loving-this
formerly venerated body of the law.3 In his 2002 essay Unloved: Tort in the

* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S., University of Pennsylvania
(Wharton School), 1973; J.D., Cornell University, 1977. My thanks go to John C.P. Goldberg, Vincent
R. Johnson, Robert Rabin, and Pierre Schlag for helpful comments regarding an earlier draft of this
article. As always, I am indebted to my J.D.-Ph.D. in English literature spouse, Teresa Faherty
Blomquist, for her loving and insightful comments.
1. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern LegalAcademy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1501,
1503 (2002).
2. Id. at 1502.
3. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Tort, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIEs 21

(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (focusing on the conception of tort law as accident and
regulatory law in twentieth century scholarship); Goldberg, supra note 1 (asserting that tort law
deserves a rebirth as a loveable and embraceable field oflegal theory); John C.P. Goldberg, TwentiethCentury Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003) (outlining the five most prominent approaches to tort
law in the twentieth century and suggesting measures to improve academic discourse in this area).
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Modern Legal Academy, he eloquently described how academic lawyers of yore,
like William Blackstone, embraced tort law "as a small piece of what he took to be
the gorgeous mosaic of the liberal state's complex system of law."4 Goldberg
elaborated:
Just as the structure of English government-King, Parliament,
and common law-helped protect rights against official tyranny,
so [Blackstone loved] tort [for] defml[ing] and defend[ing] the
right not to be battered, detained, defamed, dispossessed or
otherwise injured by others. Tort therefore helped fulfill the
social contract. Upon entering civilized society, individuals give
up their natural right to wreak vengeance on their wrongdoers in
the apparatus of
exchange for the positive legal power to invoke
5
the state to obtain legal redress from them.
After Blackstone's love affair with torts in the eighteenth century, the youthful
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had what Goldberg suggested was a dalliance with tort
law during the second half of the nineteenth century. 6 "Holmes was the first
modem theorist of tort. As such, he presided over its reorientation around the tort
of negligence, as well as its corresponding elevation to the status of a major
department of the law." 7 With some wry jocularity, Professor Goldberg
acknowledged that while "it is a bit of a stretch to describe Holmes as a lover of
tort, for he seems not to have been a lover of anything or anyone," Holmes
"mustered at least as much affection for tort as for anything else in his life."'
According to Goldberg, with the advent of the twentieth century, tort gained
two more intellectual suitors in Francis Bohlen and Benjamin Cardozo.9 "Both men
devoted themselves to recrafting the common law of tort to better fit the new age
of industrial and motorized vehicle accidents."'" Indeed, Cardozo "saw in the
concepts and byways of the common law all the resources necessary to adapt

Goldberg and his co-authors imply in the preface to their casebook that tort law is venerable because
it is so rich and adaptable:
This book adopts a perspective on [tort] law that we hope is refreshing. It is, of
course, vital that first-year law students come to appreciate that "the law" is not
a rule book-that there is play in its joints and deep tensions in its soul. Yet it is
equally important that students not be left with the skeptical lesson that [tort] law
is nothing more than what a particular judge or jury says it is. Thus, in these
materials, we strive to help students grasp how the key concepts oftort-concepts
such as "reasonable care," "causation," and "intent"-structure and organize
legal analysis even as they point it in new directions. A good lawyer, we hope to
demonstrate, is one who appreciates both the limits and the flexibility of tort
doctrine; one who has a sense of how to make innovative and progressive
arguments from within the law.
John C.P. Goldberg et al., Preface to TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS xx (2004).

4. Goldberg, supranote 1, at 1504.
5. Id. at 1504-05.
6. See id. at 1505-06.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 1506 (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1977)).
9. See id.
10. Goldberg, supra note 1,at 1506 (citing George Priest, The Invention ofEnterpriseLiability:
A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,
465-68 (1985)).
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Blackstone's law of private redress to the wrongs perpetrated by railroad owners,
automobile drivers, and product manufacturers."'"
But, as explained by Professor Goldberg, tort law began to encounter ridicule
and disrespect a few decades into the twentieth century. 2 Tort scholars like
Fleming James and Albert Ehrenzweig "explicitly condemned tort" for its slowness
in according relief to accident victims and for its arbitrariness in deciding cases.' 3
According to Goldberg, later scholars such as Mark Franklin and Jeffrey O'Connell
picked up this line of explicit dirision toward tort.' 4 Moreover, another group of
twentieth century tort scholars, led by Leon Green and William Prosser, exploited
tort law for the power and influence it could provide "armchair policymakers (law
professors)."' 5 As Goldberg described it, these tort gold-diggers did not "love[ ] tort
law for what it is," but for its "blank check" propensity "to conferjurisdiction" and
to legitimize "de novo 'social engineering.'
A prominent contemporary exploiter
of tort law, in Goldberg's view, is Judge Richard A. Posner. 7 Contrasting Posner's
conservative exploitation of tort with the ideas of those whom he views as
contemporary liberal exploiters of tort, like Professors Thomas H. Koenig and
Michael L. Rustad, Goldberg opined as follows:
If, for Koenig and Rustad, the great thing about tort is that it
permits judges and juries to adopt the role of unappointed
corporate ombudsmen, for Posner the great thing about tort is that
it permits judges to act as roving efficiency commissioners
charged with the task of identifying and achieving the costefficient mix of precaution and injury. 8
Professor Goldberg perceived other modem tort scholars like Richard Epstein
and Jules Coleman as unlovers of tort, at worst, and cool, detached proponents of
tort law, at best-both refusing to embrace tort law for what it is instead of what it
might become, as refashioned to meet their own idiosyncratic philosophical
critiques.' 9 And, even Professor Ernest J. Weinrib, in Goldberg's view, while

11. Id. (citing John C.P. Goldberg, The Life ofthe Law, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1419, 1455-74(1999)).
12. See id. at 1509-13.
13. Id. at 1509 (citing Priest, supra note 10, at 470-83).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1510.
16. Goldberg, supranote 1,at 1510-11 (quoting WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 3, at 15 (lst ed. 1941)).
17. Id. at 1512.
18. Id. (footnote omitted). Goldberg's discussion of Koenig and Rustad focuses on their book:
THOMAS H. KOENIG&MICHAELL. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001). According to Goldberg,

in reference to this book, "[plerhaps a better title would have been The Political Usefulness of Tort
Law." Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1511 n.4 1. In reference to Posner, Goldberg asserts that efficiency
as a primary Posnerian focus is "the clear implication of Posner's rejection of the idea that law and
moral principles constrain adjudication, his corresponding overt embrace of open-ended, policy-based
judicial decisionmaking, and his belief that aggregate efficiency is, at a minimum, the prime policy
consideration to which he... attends and should attend." Id. at 1512 n.45. For this author's view that
Judge Posner's judicial opinions (including some tort opinions) express a more nuanced, multi-faceted
judicial philosophy than mere efficiency and wealth-maximization, see Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent,
Posner-Style: Judge RichardA. Posner's FirstDecade ofDissentingOpinions, 1981-1991-Toward
an Aesthetics ofJudicialDissentingStyle, 69 Mo. L. REV. 73 (2004) or Robert F. Blomquist, Playing
on Words: Judge RichardA. Posner'sAppellate Opinions, 1981-82-Ruminationson Sexy Judicial
Opinion Style Duringan ExtraordinaryRookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2000).
19. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1513-15.
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saying that tort law is "'just like love,"' 2 does not truly love tort law; if Weinrib
was a true lover of tort, he would have higher aspirations for his beloved instead of
being resigned, as Goldberg seemed to see Weinrib, to fatalistically accepting the
content of modem tort law as an ingrained and unmalleable part of the human
practice and heritage of corrective justice.2
Professor Goldberg trumpeted a call for those with a deep love for tort law-for
its content and for its power; for its substance as well as its form-to offer up their
affection and future aspiration for tort. Although his call is magnetic, this Article
quibbles with both his critique of Weinrib and his aspirational insistence on
doctrinal coherence for tort. In speaking up for tort law, on one level, this Article
sounds a bit schmaltzy-like Ricky Ricardo, striking up his band to play the theme
song for the 1950s TV program, I Love Lucy. Yet, on another level, Goldberg's
article creates an irresistible challenge accepted in this Article-the product of a
torts professor of eighteen years and a sometimes practitioner in the field-to pick
up the gauntlet and join him in an effort to defend and to re-enchant this beloved
subject.
The lusty month of May! I sit grading bluebooks in my Bahama blue-colored
study in my Frank Lloyd Wright- inspired 1915 condominium building in Oak Park,
Illinois, which I share with my wife. During moments like these (mostly
dispiriting), I often think I might be inclined to agree with the dismal assessment
made by the unlovers of tort identified by Professor Goldberg. Too many of my
students tend to throw in everything-but-the-kitchen-sink-type arguments while
groping their way through their final torts examinations. When I read these
bluebooks, I wonder whether tort law really might be as incoherent and unlovable
as some of the tort unlovers claim, either explicitly or implicitly. But occasionally,
I come upon a bluebook that identifies nuanced issues in the problems presented;
delineates key tort concepts, doctrines and principles that might help resolve the
issues; and boldly concludes its analysis with specific advice for a client or
arguments for a court. The latter, of course, merits the A in the course (and even the
course honors) since they portray the law of torts as modestly intelligible, socially
useful, and worthy of our affection.
The goal in this Article is to spark the re-enchantment of tort for the twenty-first
century. Part II consists of a short but wide ranging discussion of a philosophical
model of love for tort law. As part of this rumination, this Article attempts to
diagnose the general cause for the tort unlovers' malaise, identified by Professor
Goldberg, as first being rooted in a misunderstanding of Ernest Weinrib's
conception of tort law as non-functional, private law. Thus, on this point, Professor
Goldberg might harbor a mild disapproval for the structure of tort law which,
hopefully, he will overcome. Then, to help tort unlovers better appreciate the
intrinsic attractiveness of tort, Part III delves into the robust aesthetics, both
functionalist and non-functionalist, of modem tort law. Finally, the goal in Part IV
is to explain why modem tort law is aesthetically worthy of being loved, even
though it has disappointed many scholars in certain respects.

20. Id. at 1501 (quoting ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6 (1995)).
21. Id. at 1515-17.
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II. A STARTING POINT FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE FOR TORT LAW
A.

On the GeneralNature ofLove andDisappointedLove for Tort Law

The object of the emotion love is a beloved. While humans are accustomed to
thinking of other persons as the potential objects of their love-attractive by virtue
of qualities such as beauty and goodness-humans also come to love, or not to love,
non-human objects. Thus, humans regularly consider loving concrete objects: for
example, a girl named Teresa, a guy named Jack, a sculpture by Picasso, a new
Ferrari, or a rose garden. But more rarely do humans consider loving abstract
objects: freedom, democracy, or education, for example.
As philosopher Sam Keen expressed in his book To Love and Be Loved,
"[c]lassical philosophers and theologians ... insisted that love can thrive only in
"For the Buddha, compassion was necessarily
combination with other virtues.
linked to wisdom. For Saint Paul, the trinity was faith, hope, and love. For Paul
Tillich, love, power, and justice stand or fall together."23 Indeed, "[m]ost
premodem theories consider love to be an elixir that gradually dissolves the
boundaries we erect between the self and others and progressively drives the ego
beyond individualism, beyond the sanctuary of intimacy, into a more and more
inclusive community."24 On one hand, according to Keen, all "unhappy love
stories"--those involving disappointment and disillusionment---"are all the same."2
All unhappy love stories "exhibit the same endlessly repeated, boring pattern of
resentment, bickering, withholding, blame, disrespect, inattention, abuse, and so
on."' 26 On the other hand, happy love stories "are all creative and unique"2 7 and
"[w]hen we love, we live in a reenchanted world that is governed more by what may
yet happen than by what
has already happened, by possibilities that lie beyond our
2
wildest imagination.

1

Professor Goldberg has performed a great service by describing how various
tort scholars of recent decades are really tellers of an unhappy love story about tort
law because tort law has disappointed them in its substantive payoff. As Goldberg
29
indicated, these unlovers apparently resent tort because of its often ad hoc, policy0
driven ways of resolving disputes that sometimes "smack too much of crude
vengeance"'" and its tort stories3 2 that are "too grim [and] too preposterous."33
More specifically, Goldberg explained that many tort scholars are jilted lovers of
tort who do not want to embrace modem tort law because, for them, it has "become
awkward for at least three reasons":34 (1) "we have asked too much of it";3 (2)

22. SAM KEEN, To LovE AND BE LOVED 15 (1997).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. KEEN, supra note 22, at 217.
29. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1518 n.63 (observing that "while the tort system can serve to
provide sporadic advances toward distributive justice, this sort of'ad hoc-ery' generates hostility not
only to tort (hence modem tort reform), but to the perceived beneficiaries of the system, i.e., the persons
who stand to benefit from a more above-the-board system of redistribution").
30. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
31. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1517.
32. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
33. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1518.
34. Id.

35. Id.
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"modem academics have tended to gauge tort on a set of rigged criteria";3 6 and (3)
tort scholars "have sucked much of the law out of tort, leaving institutional actors,
particularljudges, with a diminished sense of professional self when confronting
tort suits.""
In my attempt to amplify and build on Professor Goldberg's optimistic
manifesto of love for tort law, I contend that many scholarly unlovers of tort fail to
see the potential in modem tort law for a re-enchanted law of torts because they are
locked into the discourse of telling an unhappy love story-replete with blame,
disrespect, withholding, and abuse-and because they fail to appreciate the essential
goodness, resilience, adaptability and beauty of modem tort doctrine.3' For similar
reasons, I contend that unlovers of tort law fail to see the trajectory of modem tort
law and its promising future evolutionary possibilities.39
B. What Ernest Weinrib Really Meant
Professor Goldberg cited Professor Ernest Weinrib for the proposition that
private law-which includes contract, restitution, property, and tort-is "'just like
love." 4 According to Goldberg, what Weinrib meant by this cryptic comparison
is that "tort law is like love in that it cannot be understood by reference to its
purpose or function" and thus cannot be made intelligible by reference to "the social
functions it happens to perform."'" Goldberg claimed that "tort to Weinrib
resembles sport. The sports fan appreciates how the rules, practices, and
participants in a game like baseball or basketball come together to create a
distinctive enterprise," but the sports fan, like the lover, according to Goldberg,
"does not ask what is the point or purpose of the sport."42
Recall Professor Weinrib's seminal 1995 book,43 upon which Professor
Goldberg relied to describe Weinrib as an unlover of tort.' How did Professor
Weinrib really describe tort law? How did Weinrib compare tort law to love? What
did Goldberg leave out of his description of Weinrib's analysis of tort law as a type
of private law?
1. The Importance of Tort Law
Professor Goldberg failed to mention Professor Weinrib's view on the
importance of tort law as a key component-along with property law, contract law,
and the law of restitution-in what he terms "private law."4 5 On the first page of
his book, Weinrib extolled the importance of private law as "a pervasive
life, a silent but ubiquitous participant in our most
phenomenon of our social
46
common transactions":

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
40. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1501 (quoting ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6

(1995)).
41. Id. at 1502.
42. Id.
43. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).

44. See generally Goldberg, supranote 1, at 1502 (discussing how Weinreib, by stating "that tort
is just like love," actually demonstrates that tort is unloved).
45. See WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 1.
46. Id.
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[Private law] is the public repository of our most deeply
embedded intuitions about justice and personal responsibility.
Private law is also among the first subjects that prospective
lawyers study. Its position in law school curricula indicates the
consensus of law teachers that private law is the most elementary
manifestation of law, its reasoning paradigmatic of legal thinking,
and its concepts presupposed in more complex forms of legal
organization.
Based on this thesis, then, Weinrib would not be inclined-as Goldbers
contended he would-to equate "love" of sport with love of a beloved inamorato.
Tort law for Weinrib is different in kind from mere sport; to him tort law is, like a
romantic lover, of the highest importance worthy of total commitment.
2. The Non-FunctionalAesthetic Value of Tort Law
Professor Goldberg did not give enough attention to Professor Weinrib's
contrarion, non-functionalist view of tort law as a component of private law. While
Goldberg alluded to Weinrib's "idea of the internal intelligibility" 49 of tort law as
a species of private law, 0 Goldberg's explanation oversimplifies the nuanced points
that Weinrib made about the intrinsic aesthetic beauty of private law in general, and
tort law in particular. Moreover, Weinrib's account is richer than Goldberg implied.
Based on Weinrib's view, tort law (along with property law, unjust enrichment law,
and contract law) is worthy of love because, as private law, it: (a) is "an autonomous
body of learning,"s' (b) is distinct from politics, 2 (c consists of key concepts that
should be "taken seriously and in [their] own right,"5 and (d) is a distinct enterprise
from the realm of public law.' Weinrib explained this idea more fully:
In asserting that the sole purpose of private law is to be
private law, I aim to undermine [functionalist] assumptions.
I .

.

. argue that private law construes the litigating parties as

immediately connected to each other. Interaction so conceived is
categorically distinct from that of public law, which relates
persons only indirectly through the collective goals determined by
state authority. The different mechanisms for enunciating legal
norms-adjudication and legislation-broadly reflect the different
contours of these two modes of interaction. The autonomy of
private law as a body of learning is a consequence of the
distinctiveness of private law as a mode of interaction. To
understand private law, we must take seriously its fundamental
concepts, which, far from being surrogates for the operation of
independently justifiable collective purposes, are the juridical
markers of the immediate connection between the parties.

47. Id.
48. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
49. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 6.
50. Goldberg, supranote 1, at 1502.
51. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 6.

52. Id. at 7.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Understood in this way, private law is a juridical, not a political,
phenomenon. By thus jettisoning the functionalist assumptions
we can return to the idea that private law is to be understood from
within. 5"
Moreover, Professor Weinrib's account of tort law as a critical component of
private law 6-- under-appreciated in Professor Goldberg's synopsis-focuses on tort
law's aesthetic attractiveness and three-part, mutually-reinforcing internal
coherence: (a) the "immanently intelligible" theoretical framework,

(b) the

"Aristotle[an] conception of corrective justice as the unifying structure that renders
private law relationships immanently intelligible,""8 and (c) the "normative force"
of the corrective justice paradigm.
3.

9

The Praiseworthy Bipolarity of Tort Law's Proper Focus on
CorrectiveJustice

Professor Goldberg misunderstood Professor Weinrib's discussion of corrective
justice in tort law as a tribal "fidelity to 'our' tort law" that is "powerful, almost

55. Id. at S.
56. Weinrib placed particular emphasis on "the treatment of accidental injuries in the common
law of torts," in explicating his theory of private law. Id. at 20. Weinrib did this "[b]ecause the
negligent defendant's culpability seems morally detachable from the fortuity of injury, liability for
negligence poses a particularly severe challenge to the stringent notion of coherence" he claimed exists
in private law. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 20. Accordingly, Weinrib argued that "[i]f formalism
illuminates negligence law, it presumably illuminates less problematic bases of liability as well," id.,
such as liability for breach of contract or unjust enrichment.
57. Id. at 18. Weinrib fully described the theoretical framework:
The first thesis concerns the theoretical framework. An internal account of
private law sets in opposition to contemporary functionalism the thesis that
private law is immanently intelligible. Building on the jurist's understanding of
private law as a distinctive and coherent ensemble of characteristic features, the
thesis integrates the distinctiveness, the coherence, and the character of private
law into a single theoretical approach. Underlying this integration is the notion
that one understands a legal relationship through its unifying structure, or "form."
Applied to private law, the thesis of immanent intelligibility is a version of legal
formalism.
Id.
58. Id. at 19. Weinrib contended that his second thesis "identifies Aristotle's conception of
corrective justice as the unifying structure that renders private law relationships immanently
intelligible":
Corrective justice is the pattern of justificatory coherence latent in the bipolar
private law relationship ofplaintiff to defendant. By abstractly schematizing this
pattern, Aristotle made manifest the distinctive rationality ofprivate law. And by
decisively distinguishing corrective from distributivejustice, Aristotle established
the categorical difference between private law and other legal orderings.
Id.
59. WE1NRIB, supranote 43, at 19. Weinrib described his third thesis:
The third thesis concerns the normativeness ofcorrective justice. Corrective
justice is thejustificatory structure that pertains to the immediate interaction of
one free being with another. Its normative force derives from Kant's concept of
right as the governing idea for relationships between free beings. For Kant,
freedom itself implies juridical obligation. On this view, the doctrines, concepts,
and institutions of private law are normative inasmuch as they make a legal
reality out of relations of corrective justice.
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moving," but "is not love precisely because of its fatalistic undertones."60 Goldberg
was mistaken when he argued the following:
Weinrib says that we must attend to corrective justice because we
are who we are; we can do no other. In so saying, he fails to
capture the ineliminable aspirational aspect of love. One cannot
love something that one does not respect, admire, or embrace, at
least a little bit. A person or thing must contain at least a shadow
or flickering of the good before it can become the object of our
affection. It is not enough that he, she, or it is simply ours.6'
As explained above, Weinrib admired and embraced the internal coherence of
tort law as an aspect of private law.62 The focal point of Weinrib's enthusiastic
love for tort law is tort law's doctrinal requirement for a bipolar linking of the tort
claimant with the tort defendant, as exemplified by negligence law, to "consider the
63
entitlement ofthis particular plaintiff to reparation from this particular defendant.
Indeed, Weinrib's theoretical description of modem negligence law contains much
more than "a shadow or flickering of the good," 6 according to Goldberg. Weinrib
beamed with Newtonian exuberance65 about the internal dynamics of negligence
law:
[C]orrective justice is immanent in the most fundamental concepts
of negligence law. By tracing different aspects of the progression
from the doing to the suffering of harm, these concepts coalesce
into a single normative sequence and thus instantiate corrective
justice. Throughout, negligence law treats the plaintiff and the
defendant as correlative to each other: the significance of doing
lies in the possibility of causing someone to suffer, and the
significance of suffering lies in its being the consequence of
someone else's doing. Central to the linkage of plaintiff and
defendant is the idea of risk, for "risk imports relation." The
sequence starts with the potential for harm inherent in the
defendant's wrongful act (hence the standard of reasonable care)
and concludes with the realization of that potential in the
plaintiff's injury (hence the role of misfeasance and factual
causation). The concepts of duty of care and proximate cause link
the defendant's action to the plaintiff's suffering through
judgments about the generality of the description of the action's
potential consequences. Each of the negligence concepts traces
an actual or potential connection between doing and suffering,
and together they translate into juridical terms the movement of
effects from the doer to the sufferer. In this way the negligence
60. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1517.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
63. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 170; see also id. at 63-66 (discussing the bipolarity of corrective
negligence law).
64. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1517.

65. See generally JAMES GLEICK, ISAAC NEWTON (2003) (examining the life and unpublished
writings of Sir Isaac Newton, British scientist and philosopher who devoted his life to the study of
physics, optics, and calculus and whose work, most prominently his three laws of motion,
revolutionized scientific thought in the seventeenth century).
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concepts form an ensemble that brackets and articulates a single
normative sequence. 66
Weinrib criticized some aspects of modem strict liability tort doctrine. 67 But
Weinrib concluded with a lover's lament that "the theoretical case for basing tort
liability on the causation of harm without fault is inconsistent with the equality and
correlativity of corrective justice and with the concept of agency that underlies
Kantian right., 68 Moreover, Weinrib thought it a good thing that four tort doctrines
associated with strict liability "do not exemplify liability on causation alone."69
Indeed, "[1] [r]espondant superior and [2] liability for abnormally dangerous
activities can be understood as extending the operation of fault,"" while "[3]
nuisance law and [4] the incomplete privilege regarding the preservation ofproperty
embody corrective justice in the relationship of one property owner to another.'
I. A ROBUST AESTHETICS OF MODERN AMERICAN TORT LAW
A. PierreSchlag 's Aesthetics ofAmerican Law
Professor Pierre Schlag made an apt observation in his landmark 2002 article,
The Aesthetics of American Law7 2 : "Law is an aesthetic enterprise. Before the
ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can even be articulated, let alone
realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within which those
projects will have to do their work." 3 Schlag broke new ground in his article by
arguing for what might be called a robust aesthetics of American law. Moving
beyond what he characterized as "a conventional understanding of aesthetics as the
province of beauty and fine art,"" leading to "a moral idealization of aesthetics or
a romanticization of law (or both), 75 Schlag based his project on articulating a
"description of those76 recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and
identity of the law.",
Professor Schlag's aesthetically robust descriptive scheme of American law
clarifies the multiple (and often unruly) dimensions of modem American tort law
and encourages better appreciation of Ernest Weinrib's more limited, traditional
aesthetic of tort law.77 From this enhanced comprehension, perhaps, some scholars

66. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 168-69 (footnote omitted) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad
67.
68.
69.

Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
See id. at 171-203.
Id. at 203.
Id.

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics ofAmerican Law, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (2002).
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
See supranotes 40-71 and accompanying text. Indeed, Weinrib's conception of tort law as

a non-functional body of law resembles the art theory doctrine of aestheticism, which postulates "that
art should be valued for itself alone and not for any purpose or function it may happen to serve"; thus,
this "idea of art for art's sake is associated with a cult of beauty, which had its roots in Kantian
aesthetics and the Romantic movement, although its potential application is wider than that." A
COMPANION To AESTHETICS 6 (David Cooper ed., 1992).
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and lawyers can-as discussed below-actually come to love modem American tort
law with its many (functional and non-functional) layers of complexity."8
Schlag provided a four-part aesthetic of American law: (1) a grid aesthetic, (2)
an energy aesthetic, (3) a perspectivist aesthetic, and (4) a dissociative aesthetic.'
Before describing these four aesthetics in the context of American tort law, this
Article will set forth Professor Schlag's general theories about them. First, the grid
aesthetic pictures law as follows:
[The grid is a] two-dimensional area divided into contiguous,
well-bounded legal spaces. These spaces are divided into
doctrines, rules, and the like. Those doctrines, rules, and the like
are further divided into elements, and so on and so forth. The
subjects, doctrines, elements, and the like are cast as "objectforms." They exhibit the characteristic features of objects:
boundedness, fixity, and substantiality. They have insides and
outsides that are separated by well-marked boundaries. The
resulting structure-the grid-feels solid, sound, determinate.
Law is etched in stone. The grid aesthetic is the aesthetic of
bright-line rules, absolutist approaches, and categorical
definitions.80
Second, in the Schlagian energy aesthetic, "law is cast in the image of energy.
Conflicting forces of principle, policy, values, and politics collide and combine in
sundry ways." 8' Moreover, "[p]recedents expand or contract in accordance with the
push and pull of policy and principle. Legal rules, principles, policies, and values
have magnitudes that must be quantified, measured, and compared. Movement and
flux are the orders of the day."82 Third, with the perspectivist aesthetic Schlag
theorized the following:
the identities of law and laws mutate in relation to point of view.
As the frame, context, perspective, or position of the actor or
observer shifts, both fact and law come to have different identities.
Accordingly, the social or political identity of the legal actor or
observer becomes the crucial situs of law and legal inquiry.83
Finally, according to Schlag, the dissociative aesthetic plays the role of trickster in
law:
[As] identities collapse into each other. Nothing is what it is, but
is always already something else. Any attempt to refer to X is
frustrated, as even the most minimal inquiry reveals that X is an
unstable glomming-on of many other things that cannot be
subsumed or stabilized within any one thing. The crucial
contributions of the prior aesthetics-the grid (and its fixed
identities), energy (and its quantifiable magnitudes), and

78. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
79. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1051-52.
80. Id. at 1051.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1051-52.

83. Id. at 1052.
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perspective (and its identifiable relations)-have all collapsed.
84
No determinable identities, relations, or perspectives survive.
Professor Schlag's theory of a robust aesthetics of American law provides an
exciting springboard for a preliminary sketch (or painting) of the aesthetics of
modem American tort law.
B. Tort Law Aesthetics
1. GridAesthetics
Modem tort law has three key axes: intentional torts, negligent torts, and strict
liability torts. Interspersed along these three axes are an assortment of specific torts,
including battery, false imprisonment, and conversion (plotted off the intentional
axis); common law negligence, statutorily-rooted negligence per se, and medical
malpractice (extended off the negligence axis); and defective products liability,
abnormally dangerous activity liability, and respondeat superior (charted off the
strict liability axis).
Imagine this plotting experiment as taking place on reticulated graph paper (the
kind of paper one might have used in a high school geometry class). Each of the
discrete torts (for example, battery from the intentional tort axis) can be represented
as a rather large rectangular figure made of many smaller rectangles on the graph
paper, although the area of each rectangle will vary depending upon the relative
complexity of each substantive tort and its subsumed doctrines and principles.
Imagine taking out a box of crayons and boldly outlining each tort rectangle with
a distinct color. Consider the following thought experiment. If battery were a
color, for example, it would be cardinal red. As explained by Victoria Finlay in her
wonderful book Color: A Natural History of The Palette:86 "In our modem
language of metaphors, red is anger, it is fire it is the stormy feelings of the
heart,.... itisthe god of war,and itispower, s7 Assault, while close to battery's
emotive sensibility, would be tropical fish orange, a color more attuned to the
mental feature of a potential harmful or offensive touching, the apprehension of
blows yet-to-come. "Orange is a warning color--dangerous parts of machinery are
deliberately painted with it, the theory being that it is the most eye-catching color
84. Id. Schlag asserted that, while these four aesthetics of American law are not "exhaustive of
the aesthetics that can be discerned in American law," they are, in his opinion, "the most important."
Schlag, supra note 72, at 1052 n.13.
85. Schlag provided a rich description of his aesthetics project for American law. See id. at
1052-54. One of his more important general insights is as follows:
These aesthetics are "legal," not in the sense that they are exclusive to law (they
are not). Rather, they are legal in the sense that they are instanced in the
traditional legal materials, the usual canonical texts, sites, and scenes of law:
appellate opinions, rules, doctrines, and the like. They are integrated aesthetics
in the weak sense that each is a prototypical coalescence of:
Images and schemas,
Rhetorical forms,
Metaphors and other tropes,

Perceptual modes and sensibilities,
Dramatic tensions,
Sensory impressions, and
Emotions and feelings.
Id. at 1052-53 (footnotes omitted).
86. VICTORIA FINLAY, COLOR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE PALETI'E (2002).

87. Id. at 142.
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and people will see it and jump out of the way.""8 Ochre (iron oxide) would border
the rectangle of trespass to land-and perhaps the rectangle of its close relation
trespass to chattels-because these torts are among the oldest and most familiar, and
they bespeak a Paleolithic connection with the earth and objects made from the
earth. Indeed, these torts resonate with the ancient vintage color of ochre, which
was "the first color paint." 9 Finlay explained this color's importance:
[Ochre] has been used on every inhabited continent since painting
began, and it has been around ever since, on the palettes of almost
every artist in history. In classical times the best of it came from
the Black Sea city of Sinope, in the area that is now Turkey, and
was so valuable that the paint was stamped with a special
seal .... The first white settlers in North America called the
indigenous people "Red Indians" because of the way they painted
themselves with ochre (as a shield against evil, symbolizing the
good elements of the world, or as protection against the cold in
winter and insects in summer), while in Swaziland's Bomvu
Ridge... archaeologists have discovered mines that were used at
least forty thousand years ago to excavate red and yellow
pigments for body painting. The word "ochre" comes from the
Greek meaning "pale yellow," but somewhere along the way the
word shifted to suggest something more robust-something
redder or browner or earthier. Now it can be used loosely to refer
to almost any natural earthy pigment, although it most accurately
describes earth that contains a measure of hematite, or iron ore.
The common law tort of negligence-a largely nineteenth century invention
that has evolved into a law and economics utilitarian, risk-balancing

92
calculusgt-would be sky blue, the color of clarity and cool calculation. The

perimeter of the adjacent rectangle on the graph paper symbolizing the statutorilyinspired tort of negligence per se would be colored cobalt blue (a more directive and
insistent hue than sky blue).93

In the various strict liability tort boxes on our grid-chart, the vicarious-based
tort of respondeat superior would be charcoal black because black is a derivative
color from the absorption of other colors.9" By way of contrast, a yellow border

at 195.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 26.
90. Id. at 26-27 (endnotes omitted).
91. For an early case applying the reasonable person standard of negligence law, see Vaughan
v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). The classic negligence law risk-balancing test was crafted
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. CarrollTowing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
92. See FINLAY, supra note 86, at 304 (describing how John Tyndall, nineteenth century British
scientist, stated that he thought best while walking in the mountains, enjoying the clarity of the sky).
93. Finlay described origins of cobalt:
[Cobalt had been used in paint for years, but in its purer form it didn't reach
European paint boxes until the nineteenth century, when a scientist called LouisJacques Thenard managed to make it into a pigment. If he had been living today,
Michelangelo would have liked this blue best. It is expensive, and leans toward
violet. It was the Persians who really first found how good cobalt was a
glaze-they used it for the blue tiles of their mosques ....
Id.at 296-97. The Ming-era Chinese "coveted" cobalt and used it as a glaze on exquisitely refined
pottery. Id. at 297.
94. Id. at 71.
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would surround the tort of abnormally dangerous activity liability because of the
ambiguity of the balancing factors used in determining whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous" and the resemblance of some ofthese factors to negligencelike risk-utility analysis.96 Like the tort of strict liability for abnormally dangerous97
activity, of all the colors, "yellow gives some of the most mixed messages of all.
Thus, yellow
is the color of pulsating life-of corn and gold and angelic
haloes-and it is also at the same time a color of bile, and in its
sulphurous incarnation it is the color of the Devil. In animal life,
yellow-especially mixed with black-is a warning. Don't come
near, it commands, or you will be stung or poisoned or generally
inconvenienced. In Asia yellow is the color of power-the
emperors of China were the only ones allowed to sport sunshinecolored robes. But it is also the color of declining power. A
sallow complexion comes with sickness; the yellow of leaves in
autumn not only symbolizes their death, it indicates it. The
change shows that the leaves are not absorbing the same light
energy that they used to take in when they were green and full of
chlorophyll. It shows they no longer have what it takes to nourish
them. 98
In considering the more specific doctrines, rules, tests, and even the more
specific elements associated with each discrete tort,99 it would be interesting to
attempt to imitate the artistic enterprise of artists like Piet Mondrian. Consider the
common law tort of negligence, for example. To refine and subdivide the sky blue
rectangle symbolizing the tort,' 0 the "experimenter" might aesthetically depict the
characteristics of negligent conduct on the grid of tort law by assorted rectangles
within rectangles, each with differing shapes and areas. In this regard, first of all,
an image of Mondrian's 1942 canvas entitled New York City I comes to mind: a
painting of "primary colors-yellow, but also red and blue-[that] traverse the
square canvas, interweaving with each other."'' Mondrian's numerous, different95. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

usage," "inappropriateness," and "value").

96. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 519-20 (1977) (utilizing terms such as "common
§§ 292-93 (1965) (outlining factors the trier of fact

should consider in determining the utility and the risk of an actor's conduct).
97. FINLAY, supra note 86, at 203.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
101. HANS L.C. JAFFE, PIET MONDRIAN 122-23 (1985) [hereinafter MONDRIAN]. See Figure 1
below.

Figure 1: Piet Mondrian's
New York City I
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sized and shaped rectangles-within-rectangles vividly convey the structure of the
assorted characteristics of negligent conduct within the common law tort of
negligence, even though Mondrian's primary color scheme in this work might not
accurately depict the emotive force of the specific characteristics of the common
law tort of negligence.1 2 Thus, for instance, the objective test of a defendant's
conduct in a common law negligence action-whether the defendant's conduct
conformed to the conduct of a hypothetical "reasonable man"° 3-is nicely depicted
in Mondrian's New York City Iby one of the larger rectangles running around the
perimeter of his canvas; the objective test is an important concept and serves to
explain many of the more specific aspects of the common law tort of negligence
which smaller rectangles within those larger rectangles might represent. The
aspects might include, for example, the knowledge, experience, and perception
which a reasonably prudent person would have perceived under the circumstances
as well as those things which a reasonable person knows about the community.0 4
Take a second example: the tort of battery. A second grid-aesthetic example
seems appropriate: Mondrian's more basic 1936 canvas, Composition With Redand
Black, consisting of "an enclosed square" that is "further subdivided and enlivened
by" horizontal lines; the "squares are brought together into larger units or, if you
will, in which larger squares are divided up into [a few] smaller units."' 5 Again,
putting aside Mondrian's specific palette choices in this painting (which we might
want to modify to show the emotive force of specific characteristics of this
intentional tort), 0 6 Mondrian's minimalist, subdivided rectangles convey the
structure of the spare elements and the associated doctrines of the tort ofbattery: the
two manifestations of intent, which include a defendant's desire to cause a harmful
or offensive contact with the plaintiff or the plaintiffs apprehension of imminent
contact, or defendant's knowledge that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from defendant's conduct;0 7 the concept of the plaintiffs "person"
including those things in contact with it or closely connected and identified with
it; ' the rule that the plaintiff need not be aware of the defendant's contact at the

102. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
104. Id. §§ 289-90.
105. MONDRIAN, supra note 101, at 116-17. See Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Piet Mandrian's
Compositionwith Red and
Black

106. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.

107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF

TORTS

§§ 8A, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20 (1965).

108. Id. § 18 cmt. c.
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time;1" 9 the definition of harmful contact1 and the more expansive definition of
offensive contact; 1 and various privileges, or defenses, to battery such as
consent, 2 self-defense, 1 3 defense of others,114 and the like.
For more esoteric torts-like negligent infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, and invasion of privacy, for example-the rectilinear limitations of the
grid aesthetic in conveying the complexity and nuances of assorted doctrines and
definitions and rules tempts consideration of artists like Vasily Kandinsky (in
particular his final, "biomorphic" phase).11 5 Indeed, Kandinsky's 1936 Composition
IX, with its "superimposed planes" and "hard-edged, diagonal stripes" and "floating
rectangles, squares, and several circles at both ends,"' 1 6 captures the multiple
dimensions of these three complex torts." 7 Thus, utilizing complex imagery like

109. Id. § 18 cmt. d.
110. Id. § 15. Harmful contact is actionable if it produces bodily harm. This includes any physical
damage, however slight, to any part of the plaintiffs body (such as a cut or a bruise) or even so-called
"beneficial" contacts (like plastic surgery). Id.§ 15 cmt. a.
111.Id.§ 19. An offensive contact is one which "offends a reasonable sense of personal
dignity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (1965).
112. See id.
§§ 49-62,167-75,252-56; RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 892, 892A-892D
(1979).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63-68, 261 (1965).
§§ 76, 156.
114. See id.
115. See THOMAS M. MESSER, VASILY KANDINSKY (James Leggio ed., 1997) [hereinafter
KANDINSKY]. According to Messer, Kandinsky's art is characterized by three distinct phases:
In this first phase, with its ever more intense expressivity, the emerging
distinction between akind of painting that has gradually stripped itself of mimetic
vestiges and one that has embraced, from the outset, a non-objective mode,
becomes increasingly significant. In Kandinsky's subsequent development,
roughly from the early 1920s to the early 1930s the figurative element was
virtually excluded, and pictorial content was conveyed through quasi-geometic
means. The expressive component of painting was reduced in favor of rational
construction. The artist's final major phase, in the last ten years of his life,
revealed a painter largely freed from dogmatic prescriptions and capable therefore
of responding to fresh stimuli. He found inspirationfor a new kind ofbiomorphic
form that allowed him to strike a balance between the objective and the nonobjective, the expressive and the rational.
Id.at 8-10 (emphasis added).
116. Id.at 118-19. See Figure 3 below.

117. First, the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has special rules for bystanders
and direct victims, with various proximate cause limitations to limit emotional distress recovery. See
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)oFTORTS § 905 (1979); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 306,312, 313,
436, 436A, 456 (1965). Second, the tort of defamation is characterized by multiple rules for what is
defamatory, the degree offault a plaintiff must show on the part ofthe defendant in knowing or failing
to ascertain the falsity of a statement, and the need for proof of special damages for some defamatory
statements versus special damages rules being "actionable per se" for other defamatory statements. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 558-623 (1977). Third, the tort of invasion of privacy, as it has
developed in the caselaw to date, involves separate rules and doctrines for four distinct wrongs: (1)
appropriation of one's name or likeness; (2) intrusion upon another's privacy or private affairs; (3)
public disclosure ofprivate facts about the plaintiff and (4) placing the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye. See id. §§ 652A-652E.
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paintings by Mondrian and Kandinsky might enable the experimenter to portray the
linear dimensions of tort law on the grid. But the complexities of modem tort law
yield vital insight by shifting the experiment to the energy aesthetic.
2. Energy Aesthetics
Modem tort law is also characterized by constantly shifting forces of policy,
values, and principles that coalesce and then recombine in endless ways. The
numerous policies that press and pull on tort doctrine, rules, and outcomes bracingly
illustrate the multiple force fields of tort law. One current torts casebook,"' for
example, articulates a dozen separate policies for modem tort law:
1.

2.
3.
4.

"Liability should be based on 'fault.""... 9

"Liability should be proportional to fault."' 20
"Liability should be used to deter accidents.'1'
"The costs of accidents should be spread broadly."' 2

118. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES INAMERICAN TORT LAW (2d ed. 1999).
119. Id. at 7.
The fault principle has been strongly influential for more than a century, and it
accounts for much of the law of negligence, and other tort rules as well. In part,
it is intended to allow individuals a maximum sphere of action free of the risk of
tort liability. According to the fault principle, only where the defendant's conduct
is blameworthy should liability be imposed. In general, the term "fault" is used
in torts to encompass situations where harm is the product of intentionally
tortious conduct or failure to exercise care.
Id.
120. Id.
The proportionality principle seeks to limit or refine application of the fault
principle. In part, it holds that liability should not be levied on an individual
tortfeasor, even if fault is shown, if doing so would expose the defendant to a
burden that is disproportionately heavy or perhaps unlimited. In addition, the
principle of proportionality holds that where the tortious conduct of two or more
persons contributes to the production of harm, liability for the loss should be
allocated among the actors in accordance with the degree to which their conduct
has precipitated the damage.
Id.
121. Id.

The deterrence principle recognizes that tort law is concerned not only with fairly
allocating past losses, but also with minimizing the costs of future accidents.
According to this principle, tort rules should discourage persons from engaging
in those forms of conduct which pose an excessive risk of personal injury or
property damage. In some cases, this means nothing more than that liability
should be imposed on those who deliberately inflict injury or cause harm by
ignoring foreseeable risks. In other situations, such as those where a risk ofharm
is equally foreseeable to more than one person, the policy of deterrence favors
placing the threat of liability on the party best situated to avoid the loss, or, as
some might say, the cheapest cost avoider.
JOHNSON & GUNN, supranote 118, at 7.
122. Id.
The idea underlying the "spreading" rationale is that the financial burden of
accidents may be diminished by spreading losses broadly so that no person is
forced to bear a large share of the damages. For example, some argue that when
a defective product unforeseeably causes injury to a consumer, it is best to place
the loss on the manufacturer, even in the absence of fault, for unlike the
unfortunate consumer, the manufacturer can distribute the loss to a large segment
of the public by incrementally adjusting the price of its products. Losses can be
spread not only through increases in the costs of goods and services, but through
other devices such as taxation and insurance. Though controversial, the spreading
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5. "The costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to
bear them."' 23
6. "Those who benefit from dangerous activities should bear
resulting losses.' 24
7. "Tort law should foster predictability in human affairs."' 25
8. "Tort law should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit
of progress." 26
9. "Tort law should be administratively convenient and efficient,
and should avoid intractable inquiries."'' 2 7
10. "Tort law should discourage the waste of resources. 1 28
11. "Courts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of
government."' 2 9
12. "Accident victims should be fully compensated."' 3
principle, in recent years, has revolutionized the law of products liability and has
catalyzed other changes in tort doctrine.
Id.
123. Id.
Although this principle is not concerned with identifying which persons are in a
good position to spread liability, the "shifting" rationale is closely related to the
spreading principle insofar as it seeks to use the process of loss allocation to
minimize the economic burden of accidents. According to this view, a loss will
be less severely felt if it is placed on one with substantial resources than on one
with limited wealth, and therefore losses should be shifted to those financially
able to bear them. Proponents of this view argue, for example, that it is
undesirable to force an accident victim with only $100 in assets to bear the full
amount of a $100 loss, for doing so means than [sic] the accident will have a
devastating financial impact. In contrast, shifting the same loss to a defendant
with a million dollars in assets may be desirable, for then the loss will not really
be felt by either the plaintiff or the defendant. To be sure, the law has never held
that a poor person should always be able to recover from a rich one, or that a
wealthy person is precluded from seeking damages from one financially less well
to do. Indeed, in many quarters, there is great reluctance to applying one law to
the rich and another to the poor. Yet, the shifting rationale-sometimes
pejoratively referred to as the search for the "deep pockets"--has not been
without influence. However, its impact on tort doctrine has been less overt than
the impact of many other policy considerations.
Id. at 7-8.
124. Id. at 8.
125. JOHNSON & GuNN, supra note 118, at 8.
126. Id.
127. Id.
Only a limited amount of resources can be devoted to the administration ofjustice
in any society. This principle holds that tort rules should be shaped so that the
dollars spent on accident compensation are efficiently employed. Thus, legal
standards should not be so complex or uncertain that their application entails an
undue expenditure ofjudicial resources or imposes unnecessarily high litigation
costs on parties. So, too, convenience and efficiency discourage the pursuit of
what might be called intractable inquiries, matters where the facts are such that
even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is a substantial risk
that an erroneous result will be reached.
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 8.
There is a strong public interest in insuring that accident victims obtain the
financial resources needed to overcome the injuries they have sustained.
Proponents of this view argue that tort rules should be crafted and applied with
an eye toward this goal, even if that means diminished respect for the fault or
proportionality principles or other tort policies. A corollary to the compensation
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The push and pull of these tort policies are "sometimes antagonistic."'' By
way of illustration, "[a]dherence to the fault principle may mean that an actor will
not be held liable for an unforeseeable injury, but also that the victim of that
accident will not be compensated."' 32 But this is not always the case:
[I]t is often possible for a decision on issues of accident
compensation to advance more than one tort goal. For example,
a court may hold that a driver who causes an auto accident by
exceeding the prescribed speed limit is liable to an injured
pedestrian for all resulting damages. In that case, it may be said
that the decision bases liability on fault (because the conduct was
unreasonable and the harm was foreseeable), deters future
accidents by this driver or others (by showing that violators will
be held liable), fully compensates the victim (by imposing liability
for resulting damages), embraces a predictable standard (namely
the posted speed limit), and defers to the legislature's judgment as
to the maximum reasonable speed on the road (by holding that
33
violation of the speed limit constitutes actionable negligence).
These competing and sometimes complementary policies of modem tort law
bring to mind orreries-the clockwork, astronomical apparatuses of eighteenth
century natural philosophers. These orreries depicted the various planets of our
solar system, along with their various moons, moving in fixed orbits that
occasionally align with other planets.'34 In a related way, modem tort law's
seemingly chaotic policies may be better envisioned as akin to the free-form
sculptural works created by Alexander Calder, which came to be labeled "mobiles"
by fellow artist Marcel Duchamp. 135 Calder's 1956 mobile, Red Lily Pads,owned
by the Guggenheim museums, is apropos in representing the potential multifarious
juxtapositions and energy tensions among various tort policies in influencing
jurisprudential outcomes and in shaping doctrine, rules, and principles.'36 Reading
the following description of Calder's mobile sculptures encourages better
appreciation of those policies of modem tort law, such as the fault, deterrence, or
full compensation principles 137 which, like Calder's art, can be experienced as
"anthropomorphic metaphors":

principle is the argument that a system which awards compensation on a regular,
predictable, and consistent basis is preferable to one in which doctrinal and
administrative vicissitudes render the availability of compensation a matter of
chance.

Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 80-86 (1995) (describing

various orreries admired by Thomas Jefferson, and explaining that the first orreries were constructed
in London in 1713 and showed only the motions of the Earth and Moon, but by mid-century orreries
displayed the orbital motions of planets and their satellites).
135. GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM: A To Z 59 (Nancy Spector ed., 1992) [hereinafter GUGGENHEIM
COLLECTION].

136. See id. at 58-59.
137. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
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[The mobile] is now a vernacular art form, but when Calder
invented it the mobile was viewed as an avante-garde
achievement, a sculptural counterpart to Joan Mir6's paintings of
buoyant, biomorphic figures and Jean Arp's abstract reliefs.
Although they are nonfigurative, Calder's hanging mobiles,
particularly the monumental yet delicate Red Lily Pads, retain
references to the natural world: the dancing and spinning of the
disks evoke the intangible qualities of the air that propels them.
According to art historian Rosalind Krauss, the mobiles-as
interconnected vertical structures in space---create a sense of
volume analogous to that of the human body. In their surrender
to the pull of gravity and their displacement of space through
motion, the mobiles become anthropomorphic metaphors.'
Alternatively, meditation on Brancusi's wooden sculptures (such as Adam and
Eve, The Sorceress, and King of Kings), the dynamic interaction of various shaped
spheres, hollowed-out cubes, blocks, and curvilinear forms spark recognition of the
charged energy field of modem tort policies.'39
The grid aesthetic and the energy aesthetic" 4 can deepen understanding of the
structure of modem tort law and the interacting forces affecting modem tort law.
But a transition to the perspectivist aesthetic is necessary to put human faces on
modem tort disputes.
3. PerspectivistAesthetics
What are the various frames of reference, contexts, or perspectives of the actors
or observers in tort cases? What are their social identities? Their political
identities? The perspectivist aesthetic allows commentators to move from
consideration of tort Frids and tort energies to consider what one recent book refers
to as "torts stories":'
Behind each notable case are a host of concerns and
considerations that are hidden even from the discerning eye,
focused as it is on the court's selective recitation of the facts and
its characterization of the issues and arguments presented to it.
Often, much more can be learned from digging beneath the
surface to find out more about the parties, the events giving rise
to the claimed injury, and the corresponding context of socioeconomic circumstances in which the case arose. And then the
lawyers enter the picture. How did they perceive and present the
case-what were their lawyering strategies and how did they
shape the way the case ultimately turned out? So, too, what of
roles played by the trial judge, and in some instances, an
intermediate appellate court?

138. GUGGENHEIM COLLECTION, supra note 135, at 58.

139. See id. 52-53. Interestingly, Brancusci intended his abstract wooden sculptures to be a
"poetic evocation of spiritual thought." Id. at 52. Cf Robert F. Blomquist, Law and Spirituality:Some
First Thoughts on an EmergingRelation, 71 UMKC L. REv. 583 (2003) (encouraging the emergence

of law and spirituality as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship).
140. See supranotes 86-139 and accompanying text.
141. See TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.Sugarman eds., 2003).
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As these lines of inquiry are meant to suggest, every tort case
begins with a particular misadventure of its own, and runs the
course of a system in which distinct contributions are made by a
variety of participants along the way to final resolution. To view
these elements in fine detail is to understand the dynamic
character of tort law-indeed, the dynamic character of the
common law, more generally-in a fashion that by its very nature
2
cannot be fully conveyed in an appellate judicial opinion."
Going beyond the published appellate opinions in tort cases to examine and
appreciate the economic situation of a tort plaintiff, like part-time janitor and parttime cleaning woman Helen Palsgraf in the famous case of Palsgrafv.Long Island
Railroad Co.,"' clarifies the role of economic class in early twentieth century
America, and the insensitivities of the upper-middle-class judges to serious injuries
and inability to earn a living.'"
Ascertaining the character of a tort plaintiff demonstrates the risks that good
samaritans often face in the real world. Take, for example, Donald MacPherson,
plaintiff in the celebrated case of MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.,45 who was on
"a mission of mercy" to transport his friend to a far-off hospital for hand surgery
when one of the wheels of his automobile collapsed.'" Then consider the
seemingly all-American Iowa farm couple Mr. and Mrs. Edward Briney in Katko
v. Briney,'4 7 forced to pay considerable compensatory and punitive damages to the
thief Marvin Katko, who was severely injured by a 20-gauge spring shotgun, set
earlier by the Brineys, when he broke into their vacant farm house near Oskaloosa,
Iowa.' Fathoming the full, gritty, oppressive magnitude of the legal consequences
visited upon them enables society to sympathize with the hapless suffering of wellintentioned, but imperfect, property owners, while also feeling the pain of a
common thief who, nevertheless, deserved a tort remedy for injuries received from
protective measures taken by property owners out of all proportion to decency and
good sense. 49

142. Id. at 1.
143. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).

144. See Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Introductionto TORTS STORIES 2-8 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS
OF THE LAW 111-51 (1976) (noting Cardozo's disturbingly concise statement of the facts in Palsgraf,
shedding no light upon the individual players in the case and the ensuing disappearance of the
personalities behind the shadow of emerging tort theory); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY

REPUTATION 33-48 (1990) (discussing Palsgrafs celebrity, due in part to Cardozo's economical
statement of the facts, which omits all extraneous details of Mrs. Palsgraf's background).
IN

145. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
146. James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplijying the Facts
While Reshapingthe Law, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 141, at 41-43.

147. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
148. Id. at 658-59 (Larson, J., dissenting).
149. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Katko's jury verdict of $20,000 in actual damages and
$10,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 658, 662. The rest of the story is fascinating and painful to
contemplate. "Katko pled guilty to petty larceny and received a 30-day suspended sentence and a $50
fine," JOHN W. WADE ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 109 (9th ed. 1994), for breaking and

entering the Briney's vacant property with intent to steal old bottles and fruit jars which he thought
were antiques. Katko, 183 N.W.2d at 658. "The Brineys had to sell 80 acres of their 120-acre farm
in order to pay the judgment in this case." WADE ET AL., supra, at 109. Moreover, "[a] strange
development later arose between the parties:"

When the 80 acres were put up for judgment sale and there were no bids above
the minimum price of $10,000, three neighbors borrowed money to purchase the
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Looking at a case from the standpoint of race, ethnicity, or gender
considerations afford some illuminating insights. Take for example, Mary O'Brien,
the Irish immigrant woman who sued a steamship line for battery because the ship
surgeon gave O'Brien a vaccination before she came ashore to her new home in the
United States. 50

In O'Brien v. Cunard, the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the Cunard Steam-Ship
Company based on the privilege of apparent consent.' 5' But why did the American
courts dispense such harsh judgment on a female Irish immigrant? ' From her
perspective, Ms. O'Brien likely felt intimidated and powerless to speak up, as the
other 200 immigrant passengers no doubt felt. Was the judiciary correct to assume
that Ms. O'Brien was literate and could read the various
53 "notices" of the quarantine
regulations about the need to obtain a vaccination?'
The perspectives of lawyers in a tort case such as the Woburn, Massachusetts
groundwater contamination toxic tort case, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,' reflect the
different versions of reality involved in that dispute.' From the perspective of the
plaintiffs' lawyer, Jan Schlichtmann, the litigation process which resulted in a
bifurcated trial-with the groundwater contamination causation tried first-led to
a lengthy, expensive, and unjust result. 5 6 From the perspective of the defendant
W.R. Grace & Co.'s lawyer, William Cheeseman, the way the case unfolded
supported his client's view that "no credible scientific evidence [existed] that the

land for a dollar more, expecting to hold it for the Brineys until they won their
appeal. When they did not win, the neighbors leased the land back to them for
enough to pay taxes and interest costs on the money the neighbors had borrowed.
Several years later when land values rose, the neighbors offered to sell it back to
[the] Brineys at a price they could not afford. One of the neighbors then bought
the property from the others for $16,000 and sold it to his son for $16,500. [The]
Briney[s] and Katko, to whom the Brineys still owed money from the judgment,
then sued the neighbors, arguing that the land was being held in trust for the
Brineys and that they were entitled to the profit from the increase in value. Just
before the case came to trial, it was settled for a sum large enough to pay the
remainder of [the] Brineys' judgment to Katko.
Id. "A public outcry about the decision resulted in the introduction of 'Briney Bills' in several state
legislatures." Id.
150. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891).
151. Id. at 266-67.
152. See generally Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of O'Brien v.
Cunard,57 Mo. L. REv. 371 (1992) (one ofmany articles in a symposium edition on the O'Brien case).
153. Id. at 375-77.
154. 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988), aff'g 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983).
155. See generallyLEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION
ToACIVILACTION (rev. ed. 2002) (compilation of documents from the Anderson v. Cryovac case, with
introductory writings by the primary lawyers for each of the parties involved).
156. Schlichtmann expressed his perspective as follows:
I suggest one way to judge the Rules and their application in the Woburn
case is by reference to the first rule: Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Judged by this yardstick, how
did the application of the Civil Rules to the Woburn case measure up? Can nine
years of litigation be called "speedy"? Can litigation that consumed tens of
thousands of hours of work by hundreds of people at the cost of tens of millions
[of] dollars be fairly characterized as "inexpensive"? And can the resolution be
termed "just"? It was a resolution that involved a trial at which no family
member was allowed to tell his or her story; legal judgments about the world
which facts and the passage of time have demonstrated were clearly wrong; and
a record that was admittedly corrupted.
Jan Richard Schlichtmann, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xxvi (rev. ed. 2002).
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Grace chemicals could have reached the municipal wells before the wells were
taken out of service" and "no evidence [showed] that these chemicals are capable
of causing" childhood leukemias and other physical maladies.'
And, from the perspective of Jerome P. Facher, lawyer for the defendant
Beatrice Foods Company, the result of the Anderson case was appropriate because
Beatrice Foods did not legally cause the plaintiffs' injuries and deaths. Facher
explained his view:
I am always surprised by those who can comfortably rush to the
conclusion that a "deep pocket" defendant, once accused of
wrongdoing, must or should somehow be liable for a plaintiff's
serious personal injuries. In doing so, their conclusions-whether
motivated by sympathy, compassion or outrage-ignore the legal
necessity to prove that the defendant's conduct caused the
plaintiffs injuries. In Anderson, the plaintiffs brought their claim
to the civil justice system for resolution by a jury on the facts and
the law. Their lawyers knew that, in that system, liability is based
on fault, that fault is established by evidence, and that no loss can
be shifted from an injured party to a defendant without first
showing that the defendant's conduct caused that loss. It is still
one of the basic principles of our civil justice system that no party
should pay for losses it did not cause, no matter how serious the
injury. In Anderson, that basic principle was reaffirmed by the
very system the plaintiffs chose to decide their dispute." 8
4. DissociativeAesthetics
Sometimes, those that talk about tort law have difficulty providing coherent
forms; sometimes, commentators try to dissolve tort law forms. Professor Schlag
said, "The experience of dissociation might be described as the unraveling of a
secure identity to the point at which we really do not know what it is anymore."' 59
His reasoning is as follows:
One concept lapses into the next as the differentiations
dissipate. In the dissociative aesthetic, the state, legal rules,
custom, and psychological dispositions are not external to each
other; they are already glommed onto each other. In the
dissociative aesthetic, one comes to recognize that various
identities-to wit, law, the state, rules, custom, psychological
disposition, and more-are already so conjoined that no
conceptual work can separate them out. The sensation here is of
conceptual quicksand, of distinctions that dissipate-a kind of

157. William J. Cheeseman, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xiv (rev. ed. 2002).
158. Jerome P. Facher, Introduction to LEWIs A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xxiii (rev. ed. 2002); see also Robert F. Blomquist,

Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials,theAmerican Legal Profession, andPopularPerceptionsofthe Law, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 953 (1996) (reviewing Jonathon Harr's A CivilAction, and specifically, the problem
of "indeterminate defendants").
159. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1097.
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reality in which identitiesmorph into each
virtual *urisprudential
other.'e
Considering Professor Goldberg's description ofthe scholarly displeasure with
modem American tort law,' 6' this frustration and unwillingness to love tort law is
likely due to tort scholars being stranded in a dissociative aesthetic that sees no
rhyme or reason, no coherence, and no utility for tort law grids, energies, and
perspectives. Scholarly tort unlovers' understanding might be labeled a pessimistic
dissociative aesthetic that is wedded to logic and therefore, is dismayed at the
"hypertrophied differentiation" of modem tort law and experiences "a moment at
which the accumulation of differentiations comes crashing down, leaving the legal
self flailing around in intellectual mush."162 But, this scholarly pessimistic
dissociative aesthetic overlooks a more optimistic dissociative aesthetic that
unleashes creativity in formulating and reconstructing new tort law:
[To] appreciate the ways in which legal identities can collapse
into a multitude of associations allows the advocate or judge to
reconstruct those identities in desired ways. This breakdown and
reconstruction is perhaps the most intense aesthetic moment in
law-the point at which the legal profession is creating law.163
An optimistic dissociative aesthetic for modem tort law, therefore, allows
advocates, judges, and legal scholars, in extraordinary cases, to contemplate "new
6
torts": new concepts, new doctrines, new rules, and even new causes of action.' '
In less extraordinary tort cases, an optimistic dissociative aesthetic, drawing upon
insights from legal realism, moral theory, and critical legal studies, can empower
advocates and judges to reformulate and reconstruct tort law doctrines, moral
justifications, and social visions. 65 Even in ordinary tort cases, an optimistic
dissociative aesthetic allows advocates and judges to shape the "facts," and
therefore, the dispositive tort "law" of the dispute:
[An optimistic dissociative aesthetic] knows that "the law" and
"the facts" are created in light of each other. Practicing lawyers
know that, in an important sense, "the facts" are effects of sundry
performances: recollections, statements, behaviors, affects,
linguistic performances of clients, witnesses, experts, and more.
They know, as well, that the law is, in an important sense, an
amalgamation of signs, beliefs, events, linguistic expressions,
habits, perceptions, and prejudices that the lawyer helps compose
for the occasion: for the client, the judge, and other relative

160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
162. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1101.
163. Id. at 1098 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
164. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts ": A CriticalHistory, Taxonomy, and
Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REv. 23, 129 (1990) ("At its essence ... the term 'new tort,' as used by
American courts and commentators over the past one hundred years, is an indication, an item of
circumstantial evidence, that a court is being requested to or has decided to use judicial creativity to
alter existing tort law.").
165. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A

STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW (1987) (exploring the evolution of tort accident law and the
background influences of moral justifications and social vision on judicial opinions).
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audiences. The lawyer knows that both law and facts are, in
important ways, productions. In experiencing the fluidity of law
and fact, the lawyer is enacting the [optimistic] dissociative
aesthetic. It is, of course, often her job, as she writes her brief or
her closing argument, to reduce this fluidity to the crystal clarity
of a grid or to the moving force of energy. 66
IV. LEARNING TO LOVE TORTS
Based on the insights of Professor Goldberg, legal scholars should learn to
champion and love modem American tort law for five reasons. First, loving torts
allows scholars to appreciate the complexity of the facts and legal constructs that
compromise this unruly branch of the law without conditioning our approval on any
particular aesthetic or aesthetics. 67This appreciation can allow boundaries to
dissolve and legal activity to thrive.
Second, the grid aesthetic of tort law--compromising the marvelous
cubbyholes of separately named torts along with the accompanying doctrines,
principles, rules-is an abstract thing of beauty and some ugliness, harmony and
some disharmony, and order and some disorder, 68 that constitutes the system of
private law that governs social relations.'69 The grid aesthetic, on which Professor
Weinrib focuses with majestic insight, reveals the goodness, normative force, and
internal intelligibility of tort law's concern for non-functionalist corrective justice. 7 o
Such aesthetic form is worthy of admiration-and love.
Third, the energy aesthetic of tort law--consisting of the multiple policies that
expand, compress, or reconfigure the tort grid in interesting ways--should instill
in observers of tort law the excitement and love for the vibrating forces that pull and
push (in the artistic physics of functional, public law) on tort categories and
presuppositions.'71
Fourth, the perspectivist aesthetic of tort law, with its different views, diverse
experiences, and multiple interests, should inspire fondness, fancy, and devotion to
listening, telling, and re-telling of tort stories.' 2 Loving torts from the perspectivist
aesthetic, however, requires both a detached and unconditional appraisal of the mix
of tort stories and the cultivation of a taste for plaintiffs' tort stories, defendants' tort
stories, and non-litigant institutional tort stories.
Fifth, the dissociative aesthetic of tort law, with its incoherent forms,
dissolution of categories, and sense of collapse, is often jarring, disorienting, and
frightening, but can lead legal scholars to transformational experiences in thinking

166. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1098 (footnotes omitted). "In a tough case, however, it will often
be a better brief and a better closing argument if she has experienced the dissociative aesthetic (before

engaging in the reduction)." Id
167. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 86-117 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
17 1. See supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text; see generallyRobert F. Blomquist, Goals,
Means, and Problemsfor Modern Tort Law: A Reply to ProfessorPriest, 22 VAL U. L. REV. 621
(1988) (criticizing Professor George Priest's article Modern Tort Law andIts Reform, 22 VAL U. L.
REV. 1 (1987), and its focus on a limited number of goals tort law serves in this modern, diverse
society).
172. See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
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about tort law and, in the final analysis, can coax "tough love" and appreciation for
the catalytic potential of legal deconstruction as a prelude to legal construction.'73
V.

CONCLUSION

In a follow-up article to his Vanderbilt Law Review essay about the "unloved"
quality of modem tort law,'74 Professor Goldberg wrote about twentieth-century tort
theory.'75 Interestingly, he suggests that one possible response to tort law theory is
to "adopt a stance of congenial pluralism" because modem "[t]ort law is a
multifaceted enterprise, so ...each theory brings something to the table" and
"[e]ach... highlights factors that matter to tort law, and we should embrace them
all."176 Goldberg, however, ultimately rejects "congenial pluralism" -at least for
tort scholars, while suggesting that judges might benefit from this
approach-because, while "congenial pluralism is surely appropriate as an antidote
to dogmatism," ultimately, "it leaves academics with nothing more to do than to talk
past one another."' 77 Suggesting that academics "[c]ould... do a little better than
guidelines" for
that,"'178 Professor Goldberg offered a set of critical 7"methodological
9
the development of twenty-first century tort law. 1
Perhaps, Goldberg wants to fully love tort law but is afraid to validate (and,
therefore, love) each and every aspect of tort law because of concerns about
"coherence-a demand rooted in elemental notions of fairness, predictability, and
efficacy."'"8 Goldberg wants tort scholars (and presumably tort students, judges,
and legislators) to talk with one another instead of past one another; but, by
implication, Goldberg wants to discredit and undermine (and, therefore, not fully
love) what he views as incoherent accounts of tort law. These accounts, which
presumably for him, would attempt to merely "explain or defend tort in terms of
'
beauty or elegance." 181
Humbly, this Article suggests that learning to love torts-in all its
capaciousness and messiness-is a necessary condition to creatively reformulating
tort law for the twenty-first century.' 82 And, learning to appreciate and to validate
the four aesthetics of modem tort law-the grid, energy, perspectivist, and
dissociative, whether they reveal beauty or elegance, ugliness or disorder, coherence

173. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
174. Goldberg, supra note 1.
175. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 3.

176. Id. at 578.
177. Id. at 581.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 581-82.

180. Id. at 580.
181. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 3, at 580.
182. The following describes one of the greatest literary works on love:

Lucretius opens his poem On The Nature of Things with an invocation to Venus,
"the life-giver"-without whom nothing "comes forth into the bright coasts of
life, nor waxes glad nor lovely." Nor is it only the poet who speaks
metaphorically of love as the creative force which engenders things and renews
them, or as the power which draws all things together into a unity .... The
imagery of love appears even in the language of science. The description of
magnetic attraction and repulsion borrows some ofits fundamental terms from the
vocabulary of the passions; Gilbert, for example, refers to "the love of the iron for
the loadstone."
I THE GREAT IDEAS: A SYNTOPICON OF GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1051 (Mortimer J.
Adler & William Gorman eds., 1952) (Volume 2 of GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952)).
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or incoherence-is a necessary condition to loving torts. Thinking about tort law
should be more in the nature of assembling collectibles-like biscuit tins, chewing
gum wrappers, comics, art deco, ink wells, napkin rings, spittoons, or Civil War
memorabilia. Many collectibles, in their own time, were "unfamiliar, and very
possibly unloved or misunderstood."" 3 But over time, many collectibles became
cutting-edge, interesting, and loved. Before we judge it, let us truly learn to love
tort law.

183. CAROL PRISANT, ANTIQUES ROADSHOW 20TH CENTURY COLLECTIBLES xxv (2003).
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